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Charles E. Wilson at General Motors, 1920-19531 
A Profile in Industrial Management and Labor Relations 
As president of General Motors Corporation (GM) , Charles 
Erwin Wilson became a pioneer in bringing to the automotive 
industry unprecedented achievements during periods of both 
war and national economic recovery. For those reasons, his 
tenure at General Motors deserves close inspection. Compe-
tence and compassion contributed to Wilson's steady rise to a 
leadership position at GM, and in the American business com-
munity, bringing the executive to much public attention. 
Wilson graduated with honors from Pittsburgh's Carnegie 
Institute of Technology in 1909, where he earned the nickname, 
"Wizard. 1I Wilson had an ability to work integral calculus in 
his head. He served the Westinghouse Corporation as an engi-
neer and inventor. It was Wilson's design which led to the 
company's first electric ignition. His impressive develop-
ments for Westinghouse opened the door for Wilson to serve as 
an assistant to the chief engineer and noted electrical genius, 
B.G. Lamme. Soon after his assignment with Lamme, Wilson 
found himself in charge of the automobile-electrical equipment 
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engineering division of Westinghouse. In that capacity, Wil-
son continued to impress his supervisor with improvements in 
design and development. Meanwhile, O.F. Conklin of Remy Elec-
tric had been watching Wilson's creativity and success. In 
1919, Conklin persuaded Wilson to accept a position with the 
parent company of Remy, General Motors, after Westinghouse had 
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announcE!d plans to move its operations to an eastern city. 
Wilson went to Detroit but soon realized that Remy's of-
fice neE!ded to be located with its factory. After overcoming 
oppositton from his wife, who had fallen in love with Detroit. 
Wilson moved his office and family to Anderson, Indiana, where 
the main factory was located. At Anderson, Wilson recognized 
that Remy's products required far too many tools for an ef-
ficient mass-production system. He began redesigning methods 
of production which resulted in cost-saving efficiency. When, 
in 1926, the Dayton Engineering Laboratories Company (Delco) 
merged with Remy, Wilson was named president and general man-
ager. He developed a way by which GM would save $5 million 
annually if Delco-Remy was consolidated into the Anderson 
plant. Wilson saw that the Delco employees were relocated 
with jobs before GM moved the operations out of Dayton. These 
ingenious and cost-saving ideas eventually earned Wilson a 
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promotion to a GM vice president and a move back to Detroit. 
Wilson's years in Anderson included a great many personal 
contributions to the community, earning him the respect of his 
neighbors and business peers. One such contribution preceded 
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the merger and relocation of Delco. Wilson, keenly aware that 
the merg,er would bring an influx of new workers, led local 
business·nen in developing adequate housing facilities in the 
area. This gesture is exemplary of Wilson's ability in long-
range planning--planning that benefited both community and 
company. Linfield Myers, an Anderson banking official and 
Wilson friend, recalled Wilson as having a IIgregariousness and 
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intense desire to please. 1I Wilson's industriousness and com-
petence were significant factors in his climb to the presi-
dency of General Motors. 
Wilson's promotion offered him an opportunity to develop 
his ability to streamline production techniques and to have a 
hand in establishing the corporation's approach to labor re-
lations and collective bargaining. Labor unrest was not new 
to Wilson. He once wrote to Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., long-time 
president and chairman of GM, and shared his first experience 
with a labor dispute. 
In 1915 and 1916 I had my first experience 
with a big strike. I came to work one morning 
and found 5,000 or 10,000 men on strike and mil-
ling around the plant. While I was an engineer 
and not working in the factory at that time, they 
would not let me in. I could see I was going to 
get rough treatment if I persisted, so I took a 
street car back to Wilkinsburg and took a train 
to East Pittsburgh so I could get off on railroad 
and Westinghouse property where the pickets could 
not get at me. This experience stimulated me to 
take an interest in labor problems. (4) 
The first encounter with a labor-management disagreement 
would not be Wilson's last. He was on management's side of 
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the tablE! in 1937 when then-President William S. Knudsen 
assigned Wilson the task of negotiating an end to the lengthy 
sit-down strike between the united Auto Workers (UAW) and the 
company. Knudsen was to say. "You take care of this labor 
business. You've got more patience than I have and you talk 
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more." To deal with the union, which, by nature of the strike, 
occupied company property, Wilson needed both stamina and strong 
convictions. The strike ended, and Wilson benefited profes-
sionally from his role. In 1940, Knudsen accented President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's offer to oversee wartime production, 
and Wilson was appointed acting-president of General Motors. 
Knudsen ~30on resigned all connections with the automaker, and 
Charles Wilson became the president of one of the nation's 
largest corporations. 
When. he began his tenure as president, Wilson began a 
tradition whereby he "rarely spent even a night away from of-
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fice or plant." This practice was largely a result of GM's 
immense wartime production schedule, but Wilson's dedication 
to his job was also responsible. He has been characterized 
as exercising by "hiking through the GM plants, where he 
enjoys listening to the syncopated rhythm of the production 
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line " " Occasionally, he would go out into the workers' en-
vironment in an attempt to understand the business from their 
vantage point. One of the most admirable traits of Wilson 
was his concern for the individual worker. 
Wilson had the opportunity to reflect and examine GM's 
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position with labor on two occasions. In 1941, Wilson was 
hospitalized with a broken hip, and two years later he suf-
fered from exhaustion and was again hosnitalized. Even as 
he was idle, Wilson kept working; he set up his office in 
his hospital room and conducted business without interruption. 
On one occasion while hospitalized, Wilson shared an unusually 
philosophical interpretation of the General Motors future with 
Peter F. Drucker, the noted management specialist. 
In the three months I've been idle, I've 
been thinking about GM's future ••• To design 
the structure and develop the constitutional 
principles for the big business enterprise was 
the great achievement of the founding fathers 
of GM, the last generation. To develop citi-
zenship and community is the task of the next 
generation. We are, so to speak, going to be 
the Jeffersonians to Mr. Sloan's Federalists. (8) 
Sloan's leadership of GM had established the groundwork to 
which Wilson would add the working elements to make GM a 
strong i.ndustrial leader. It was important, therefore, for 
Wilson to make sure that a mature business atmosphere was 
created with careful consideration to the individual worker. 
Employee opinions on this matter were of interest to Wilson. 
At first he wanted to have a big employee 
sur~ey and was told that he could expect a 5 per-
cent response. "That's not enough," he said. So 
he and his staff people came up with the idea of 
a contest--"My Job and Why I Like It"--with a lot 
of prizes and outside judges to award them. (9) 
The 1947 General Motors annual report elaborated on the con-
test. 
The success of the contest is indicated by 
the fact that •.• 58.8C of those eligible, partic-
ipated. Of even greater significance were the 
nature and tone of the letters, which revealed a 
great depth of understanding and appreciation of 
what it means to work in General Motors ••• The sin-
cerf~ and direct statements of employees ••• provided 
firl3t hand evidence of how they feel and think. 
Thil3 information. coupled with constructive sug-
gestions which many employees offered, should con-
tribute importantly to our long-range program for 
making General Motors an even better place in which 
to work. (10) 
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Drucker ,:soes as far to say that the contest was Itthe crown-
11 
ing achi'9vement of his @ilson' sJ career at GM. It To deny 
the success of the contest would be erroneous; to say that 
it was Wilson's foremost accomplishment would be an under-
statement of his contributions. 
The labor relations success of Charles Wilson materi-
alized after World War II. The immediate postwar climate 
was restless. Workers were faced with mounting economic 
hardships caused by spiraling inflation. Wilson had recog-
nized the likelihood of the economic plight for the employee 
as early as 1941. At that time. during his hospitalization, 
Wilson devised a plan which would help the worker beat rising 
inflation by using • 
••• Wage adjustments based on changes in the 
cost of living •.• Otherwise, the corporation would 
continually be in the position of giving increases 
to some of its employees and not to others--which 
would be logical enough as far as the economics of 
the case went, but which might create real psycho-
logical problems. 
The other point put forward by Mr. Wilson 
concerned the means of affording our workers a share 
in rising productivity. It was his contention that 
the only feasible way to do this was to set a fixed 
increase which each worker would receive annually. 
This proposal was the origin of the Itannual improve-
ment factorlt in the General Motors formula. (12) 
7 
Wilson was not able to introduce these proposals until the 
1948 contract negotiations. 
Labor negotiations became a specialty of Wilson, and 
his achievements in this area were a source of pride. As he 
once said. 
The test of labor relations isn't rhetoric. 
The test is results. We lose fewer days to strikes 
than any other major company in this country •.• We 
have greater continuity of union leadership. And 
both the union and we get the things the country, 
the company, and the union need. high discipline, 
high productivity, high wages, and high employment 
security. A union is a political organization and 
needs adversary relations and victorious battles. 
And a company is an economic organization and needs 
productivity and high discipline. At GM, we get 
both--and to get both we need the union relations 
we have. (1) 
Central to his approach in creating workable labor re-
lations was Wilson's perception of the fundamental policies 
of General Motors. In 1955, Wilson reflected on the prin-
ciples as he saw them ten years earlier. 
1. The careful selection and placement of 
employees, to make sure that they are physically, 
mentally, and temperamentally fitted for the jobs 
they are expected to do. 
2. The education and training of employees, 
so that they will qualify for better jobs, and so 
that they will be able to do more efficiently the 
current work they are assigned to do. 
). The organization of employees of the cor-
poration, throughout the various divisions and the 
various types of operations, into effective oper-
ati.ng units. Perhaps I might sum it up by calling 
it the over-all business administration of the cor-
poration. so that each man will know what is expect-
ed of him and there will be the minimum amount of 
fri.ction and unnecessary work •••• 
4. The tools, facilities, and places to 
work supplied to the employees. In other words, 
the better the tools, the better the machinery, 
the better the working environment, the more that 
can be produced ••.. 
5. Individual application to the job. To 
develop the maximum personal application to the 
job at hand requires sound incentives. It re-
quires fair recognition for the results achieved, 
so that the fifth point is individual application 
to the job under an operating plan providing for 
incentive and recognition for work. 
6. The products, new and old, that we plan 
to manufacture and sell. To back this one up, we 
must have the soundest research and engineering, 
and the proper anproach to the products which we 
are going to undertake to deliver to the people 
of our country, so that we can promote our slogan 
of "more and better things for more people." (14) 
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Each of the six principles is oriented towards all GM employ-
ees. With management personnel, Wilson had a good deal of 
flexibility in assigning them to suited tasks. Similar place-
ment of union members was restricted within the context of 
a contract. Work measurement, work incentives, work effi-
ciency, and cost-effectiveness were in their infancies in 1945; 
Wilson gave sophistication to them during his tenure in the 
automotive industry. The fifth point made by Wilson has pos-
sibly sE!rved as a basis for contractual language of present-
day union-management agreements; incentives and recognition 
programs were absent in 1945 as well. The concluding prin-
cinle is, in effect, paid for by the first five. GM's goal 
is to provide quality products to the customer so that the 
consumer remains a buyer in the future. Concern for the in-
dividual worker transcends the GM environment, training, 
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expectations, facilities, and product. Wilson's perception 
of purpose was astute; his implementation of these ideals 
was a sincere effort recognized by the UAW forces headed by 
Walter Reuther. 
The first face-to-face meeting between Wilson and Reuther 
came in the 1939 negotiations involving General Motors and the 
UAW. Walter Reuther was an extremely adept negotiator and a 
strong-willed man who advocated his union's views with a pow-
erful vigor. It was difficult for most corporate executives 
to get along well with Reuther, but Wilson did better than 
most. The conservative Wilson seemed to complement the often 
radical and unrelenting Reuther. Over the years, the two 
leaders were able to develop a good rapport in regard to their 
respective interests. One industry observer noted. 
Reuther and Wilson had a special, trusting 
relationshin. The red-headed militant and the 
white-hairea millionaire frequently met private-
ly exchanging ideas and developing a warm friend-
ship. They often talked on the telephone for a 
half-hour or lone;er. Years afterward, Reuther 
said. 
"I've always thought that C.E. Wilson was 
rea.lly a very decent, genuine human being. The 
test of that is whether you ca.n still act human 
after going through the GM corporation machine, 
and he passed the test." (15) 
Tha.t both men, with such differing responsibilities, 
would not let business affect personal relationships is the 
hallmark of professionalism; even with reservations about 
one another, admiration coexisted with ae;gravation. Wilson 
once remarked that union demands represented "business as 
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usual." Reuther responded with a sharp jab: 
Mr. Wilson and three other top executives of 
General Motors are drawing salaries and bonuses of 
$6,644,437 a year. Maybe these things ought to be 
brought up when Mr. Wilson talks of sacrifices and 
business as usual. (17) 
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Such rhetoric was common between the two men. Wilson and 
Reuther did not always draw the battle lines behind closed 
doors: 
A shrewd poker and bridge player, Wilson plays 
his best when the stakes are high. He can sit down 
with as canny a bargainer as UAW's President Walter 
Reuther and come out with his shirt on. Once he ac-
cepted Reuther's challenge to a public debate; the 
jury of newsmen, who had expected persuasive Walter 
Reuther to triumph easily, thought Wilson held him 
to a draw. "I get alon..g; with Mr. Reuther as well as 
anyone on my side of the table, tl Wilson said recently, 
"and considerably better than some on his side." (18) 
Despite similar confrontations, the working relationship that 
Wilson created with Reuther--and one that Reuther accepted--
made tough negotiating sessions a matter of professional bus-
iness administration. Wilson's ouinion of Reuther came mostly 
out of a respect for the individual workers represented by the 
union; Heuther's opinion of Wilson originated from an appre-
ciation of that respect. 
OnE! exception to the friendly relationship between Wil-
son and Reuther occurred from the tension surrounding the 
severe strike immediately following World War II. As Alfred 
Sloan suggested, the unrest was not entirely the fault of 
the corporation: 
In the early postwar period, our prospects 
for workable labor relations appeared to be re-
mote •.• During the 119-day strike, President Tru-
man formally backed up the union's controversial 
insistence that our "ability to pay" should affect 
the size of the wage increase. We successfully 
resisted this unsound proposition, but there is 
no doubt in my mind that the President's state-
ment served to strengthen the union's public 
position and thus prolong the strike. (19) 
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At issue was the Truman administration's indication that 
wages could probably be raised substantially without affecting 
costs. William H. Davis, Director of the Office of Economic 
stabilization, declared that wages could possibly be increased 
20 
as much as 50% without bein,.£!; inflationary. Wilson responded 
several weeks later by announcing that a compensatory increase 
in automobile costs would necessarily accompany a wage in-
21 
crease. furthermore, Truman's statement--"ability to pay 
is always one of the facts relevant to the issue of an increase 
22 
in wa.ges" --was not taken lightly by GM. Truman was, in ef-
fect, agreeing with Reuther's contention that General Motors 
23 
could afford a 30% increase in employee wages. 
The automotive industry was not the only business affected 
by strikE~s and governmental policies. In addition to General 
Motors and its competitors, the United Mine Workers followed 
the UAW's path. The nation's coal mines faced a shut-down if 
union demands were not met. A reduction in coal supply would 
have a. c:~ippling effect on the automotive and steel industries, 
24 
as WE!ll as the nation's economy. Wilson and General Motors 
saw an opportunity, and, to some extent, a responsibility to 
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take the lead in improving the labor environment and bringing 
the country's economy back into a comfortable position. 
Wilson's chance came in 1948. After numerous stalemate 
rounds of negotiating, GM issued a statement to the UAW put-
ting the bargaining efforts in perspective. The company 
acknowledged that the union had rightfully represented its 
position--just as the corporation had presented its beliefs. 
General Motors recognized the UAW's contentions as "protect-
ing the worker from increases in consumer prices and assuring 
the worker that the buying power of his hour of work will in-
25 
crease as the nation's industrial efficiency improves." 
The objective, then, was for the corporation to make provisions 
which allowed the workers' earnings to keep pace with rising 
inflation. 
GM proposed methods to lire-establish, protect, and im-
26 
prove the buying power of an hour of work.1I The company 
position emphasized. 
We sincerely feel that if General Motors 
and the UAW-CIO can reach agreement based on 
these objectives, that it would not only be a 
tremendous forward sten in industrial relations 
but would also be a great force in promoting 
economic stability and progress in the nation. 
Assurance of cooperation and stability over this 
period is essential if our employees are to real-
iZE! the benefits our proposals represent. (27) 
A General Motors statement of 25 May 1948 outlined the 
settlemEmt I 
1. A cost-of-living adjustment based on the 
Consumer Price Index of the Federal Bureau of Labor 
statistics of 100.2 for 1940 and 169.3 for 
April of this year and the average wage rates 
of 1940 and the present rates. This cost-of-
living adjustment has been determined to be 
8¢ per hour. 
2. An annual improvement factor to in-
crease the standard of living of workmen. The 
company has a~reed to underwrite this at 3¢ 
per hour. 
3. Quarterly adjustments in the cost-of-
living factor to be based on the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics cost-of-living index. 
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4. Wages under the formula and contract 
provisions have been stabilized for two years. (28) 
The key to the agreement is the annual improvement factor 
and the use of the cost-of-living index. Wilson's 1941 
brainchild became a reality seven years later. On the sur-
face, it anpears that GM relinquished to the Truman admin-
istration's political pressure. As evidenced by Wilson's 
thinking in 1941 and 1943, the contract negotiations of 
1948 provided the opportunity GM had been waiting to find. 
Wilson knew that to have a long-term contract, provi-
sions of some substance were needed to cement them. His 
introduction of an "escalator clause"--providing a cost-of-
living adjustment--was one such element to make the two-year 
offer attractive to the union. Also, Wilson's belief that 
workers deserved a share in the corporation's prosperity led 
29 
to the suggestion of an annual improvement factor. 
Immediately, the business community had mixed reactions 
to Wilson's precedent-setting innovations. A major corpora-
tion had not yet made a daring and far-reaching proposal in 
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collective bargaining until Wilson and GM did it in 1948. 
Criticism spawned out of fear and sheer newness. The im-
provemen"t factor was "assailed by management as too costly; 
by unions as tending to shove aggressive unionism into the 
)0 
background." Wilson had to defend the pact on the grounds 
that it did not establish a lead for other industries, In 
an address to the Rochester, New York, Chamber of Co~merce, 
Wilson answered the criticism of some businessmen toward the 
GM contract I 
It did not establish a national pattern of 
so many cents per hour. We do not believe in 
uniform national wage patterns. If through the 
years such patterns are set by a few of the large 
corporations and all industry is forced to follow 
them through union pressure, we will in effect 
have national bargaining. Collective bargaining 
will then have failed and some other means will 
have to be found for determining wages of union 
workers. ( )1) 
Wilson tried to reason that other enterprises might not be 
able to match an agreement like GM's. He encouraged similar 
bargaining efforts to be negotiated within the confines of 
the specific management and union. If other unions were as 
influential as the UAW, they, more than likely, did not heed 
Wilson's advice and began applying the GM precedent to their 
own positions. 
A favorable comment about the 1948 agreement came from 
a New York Times editorial, and Wilson used it in defense 
of the eontractl 
It would be a good deal less than accurate 
to say that, from the standpoint of national 
economic well-being, the General Motors settle-
ment has produced the perfect formula. The per-
fect formula, if we are thinking in terms of an 
antidote for inflation, would relate wage in-
creases directly to production rather than cost 
of living. But as an instrument of company-wide 
economic and social justice it has a great deal 
to commend it. (32) 
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Union and mana~ement were pleased with the workings of the 
wage formula during its two-year trial. They were so satis-
fied with the formula that it was re-worked into the 1950 
GM-UAW contract--another landmark agreement which astonished 
the industrial community and became attributed to Charles 
Wilson. 
It was, perhaps, the lack of labor unrest during the 
two years of the 1948 contract which led to the unprecedented 
five-year pact in 1950. Two consecutive multi-year contracts 
were advantageous for both concerns--management and labor--
as Alfred Sloan noted, 
These longer intervals gave the corporation 
more assurance that it could meet its long-range 
production schedules; and they also meant an im-
portant saving to us in executive man-hours, for 
labor ne~otiations have invariably consumed a 
great deal of the time of the highest officials 
of the corporation. The longer-term contracts 
also relieved our employees of their annual con-
cern over the prospects of a strike and enabled 
them to plan their own affairs with greater con-
fidence. (33) 
Gene~al Motors came out the big winner, however. with seven 
years of' uninterrupted production and an ever-strengthening 
position in American business. Wilson, with a sense of 
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humility, gave some recognition to the union for the success-
ful negotiation of the five-year agreement. He told the Na-
tional Press Club: 
The five-year agreement could not have been 
reached except for the progress made two years 
ago in adopting a formula for fair wage determi-
nation, and if the UAW-CIO had not demonstrated 
during this two-year period its sincerity and 
responsibility in carrying out agreements. (J4) 
Praise worked both ways. Walter Reuther hailed the contract 
as lithe most significant development in labor relations since 
J5 
the mass-production industries were organized." In an 
analysis of the 1950 agreement, University of Chicago econ-
omist Frederick H. Harbison gives credit to Wilson and GMI 
"Reuther accepted GM's wage formula; the corporation did not 
J6 
buy Reuther's ideas." 
The 1950 package included the 1948 escalator clause, an 
improvement factor of 4¢ per hour (a one-cent increase over 
two years previous), and an employee pension fund. In an 
address before the National Association of Food Chains, Wil-
son explained the provisions. 
The cost-of-living formula ••• adjusts the 
wages of our employees to what other pressures 
have forced on the national economy ••• The annual 
improvement factor •.• recognizes that a continu-
ing improvement in the standard of living of em-
ployees depends upon technological progress, bet-
ter tools, methods, processes and equipment, and 
a eooperative attitude on the part of all parties 
in such progress. It further recognizes the prin-
ciple that to produce more with the same amount of 
hunan effort is a sound economic and social objec-
tive •.. The pension plan &a~ worked out in order 
to assist employees in protecting themselves a-
gainst .•. the hazards of life. (J7) 
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The escalator clause and annual improvement factors had 
worked b,efore. Pension funds and five-year durations were 
the innovations of 1950. Again, Wilson unveiled concepts 
which were alien to an industry still advancing to maturity. 
In an exchange of thoughts with Peter Drucker, Wilson 
explainej his vision of the pension fundz 
Wilsonz What about employee pensions? 
There 4 or 5 percent can make a difference, 
and social security isn't going to provide 
ade~uate employee pensions for people whose 
life-time wages have been as high as those 
of automobile workers are likely to be. 
Druckerz How will you invest those funds? 
In government bonds? 
Wilson: Oh, no. In the stock market. 
Altogether they should be invested the way 
a prudent financial mana~er would invest 
them. 
Drucker: But that would make the em-
ployees, within twenty-five years, the owners 
of American business. 
Wilson: Exactly what they should be and 
what they must be. For the income distribution 
in this country surely means that no one else 
can own American industry unless it be the gov-
ernment. (38) 
Drucker called the GM Dension fund "the first that invested 
39 
according to sound principles of financial management." 
Investment of the fund was based on four guidelines. 
Professional independent management of 
corporate pension funds as "investment funds"; 
minimal or no investment in the company for 
which the employee works; no investment in any 
company in excess of 5 percent of the company's 
total capital; and no investment in any company 
of more than 10 percent or so of the total as-
sets of the pension fund. (40) 
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The pension fund is exemplary of Wilson's long-range planning 
at General Motors. The five-year contract is an example of 
a long-term peace between union and management. 
Wilson was uroud of the 1950 achievements; he considered 
them "his greatest contribution to good labor relations, ef-
41 
ficiency, stability, and industrial peace." He included 
the five-year agreement in a list of fifteen highlights of 
GM success, saying the contract "kept General Motors free 
of major labor troubles ••• while important competitors have 
had serious labor trouble ••• which importantly reduced their 
42 
competitive position." Despite the criticisms, the 1950 
contract was a significant accomplishment for labor and 
management as Wilson believed. Harbison summed up the agree-
ment as being I 
... a shrewd and realistic treaty which has 
been hammered out over a period of years by an 
unusually efficient, far-sighted, and intelli-
gent management and an unusually militant, agres-
sive, and imaginative union. (43) 
Wilson did not take part in another GM-UAW negotiation. 
Before the 1950 contract expired, President Eisenhower called 
Wilson to Washington to take a cabinet post as the Secretary 
44 
of Defense. After his departure from GM, Wilson's contri-
butions were still felt. In 1955. a new three-year contract 
was agrE!ed upon by GM and the UAW. It contained the annual 
improvement factor. the escalator clause, and the pension 
45 
plan--as well as being multi-year in nature. 
The fact that Wilson's accomplishments were felt years 
19 
after his tenure as president speaks for the significant im-
pact he had on the automotive industry. His concern for the 
individual worker was paramount in his approach to creating 
a responsible industry. Wilson's marks on labor relations 
46 
and in production plannin~ were most substantial. He was 
not always in agreement with others, and his individuality 
and candor often won him more criticism than admiration. 
Above all else, Wilson seemed to bel 
An energizing spark-plug of the world's 
greatest motor-car company, aggressive, pro-
gressive, constantly on his job; outspoken 
advocate of sound economic policies; keenly 
conscious of the social responsibilities of 
a great corporation; mindful of the just 
claims of labor and the multitude of small 
investors who have entrusted their savings 
to his stewardship. (47) 
Wilson's business career was one which earned him both praise 
and criticism. Even so, whether a supporter of his approach 
or an opponent of his direction, those who came to know Wil-
son--the man or his ideas--could only agree with Walter Reu-
ther's eulogy upon Wilson's death in September, 19611 
" ••• a top industrial executive who possessed the rare com-
48 
bination of business comnetence and deep human understanding." 
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